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Abstract  
The paper aims to recover the critical role of banks in defining the relationship between 
Financial Development and growth. We hypothesize that Banks can positively motivate 
templatized GDP growth. A System GMM estimation of GDP growth in a sample of high 
growth emerging markets from Asia investigates if bank stocks contain information beyond the 
monetary and banking aggregates. 
In a sample of emerging markets with 5% GDP growth, bank stocks create 0.22% of GDP 
growth for every 1 SD excess return in a weighted portfolio of bank stocks. The chosen 
emerging markets are homogenous based on WGI Indicators from World Bank. This 
coefficient is much higher than the recovered relationship presented by Cole, Moshirian and 
Wu (2008). Government ownership of banks and close monitoring of banks is found to be a 
positive for the overall economy while the market index is found to be not so informative about 
economic growth. 
A relook at a GMM system study from Cole, Moshirian and Wu (2008) shows better growth 
for Emerging market investors without compromising quality.  The research establishes the 
advantages of selecting emerging markets portfolios that reward better governance.  A set of 
Homogenized emerging markets can engender higher causative effects between banks and 
GDP growth allowing investors to focus on investment opportunity. 
Keywords: Banks, Economic Growth, Asia, Emerging Markets, GMM system, 2-step GMM  
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1.  Introduction and Motivation    
The recent financial crisis has polarized opinions about the banking sector and its contribution 
to economic growth. Empirical research has established their significant contribution to 
economic growth at firm, industry and country levels. A pre-crisis evaluation by Cole et al 
(2008) utilized specific bank stock returns to move away from aggregate macroeconomic 
measures in quantifying financial sector influence on future economic growth. Such an analysis 
combines the study of economic growth with conventional asset pricing theory with a focused 
investigation of the specific information content of individual bank stock returns independent 
of the information presented in market indices. This obviates the need for measuring financial 
market contribution in terms of indices and provides us with a greater level of detail. The 
differing nature of Institutional frameworks in Asia and its continuing growth memes reflect in 
an urgency to complete our understanding of growth mechanics in this region. Banks 
significantly contribute to economic growth and we show that this is not limited to the growth 
of private sector credit or money supply measures (Badaruddin, Ariff and Khalid, 2011).   
Do Bank stocks even lead economic growth? While a study of macroeconomic factors shows 
the contribution of the financial sector in pushing economic growth, the study of stock markets 
is generally limited to a study of the relationship between economic growth and stock indices.    
Cole et al (2008) studies 36 markets -- 18 developed markets and 18 emerging markets are 
included in the sample. It is one of the rare research studies in the literature that move away 
from macroeconomic aggregates of bank credit and financial markets representations by a 
general index to study the determinants of economic growth. While ibid. presents a positive 
relation between bank stocks and economic growth, Moshirian and Wu (2012) complete the 
analysis using the same dataset documenting the negative relationship of economic growth with 
bank stock volatility. Both the studies affirm the direct impact of country specific Institutional, 
legal and regulatory frameworks including insider trading, government ownership and 
accounting disclosure standards. Macroeconomic aggregates and Financial sector development 
relating banking performance to growth in panels across both highly developed and developing 
countries (Al-Moulani and Alexio, 2017; Wallis, 2017; Diallo, 2017; Diallo and Koch, 2017; 
Fufa and Kim, 2017; Issahaku, Abor and Harvey, 2017) or country specific examples (Arize, 
Kalu and Nkwor, 2017; Pan and Mishra, 2018; Diallo and Zhang, 2017; Banerjee, Ahmed and 
Hossain, 2017; Kapingura, 2017). Some studies use these empirical results to build theoretical 
frameworks around bank models (Hamada, Kanako and Yanagihara, 2017; He and Niu, 2017) 
or trace the motivations of Foreign banks and their performance (Claessens and Horen, 2016; 
Bongini et al, 2017). Mishra and Narayan (2015) use Linear Panel data models to confirm the 
significant effect of Market capitalization and stock prices on the GDP.   
 
This paper contributes to the literature in analyzing the bank stock returns’ contribution to the 
GDP growth in a meaningful way in a sample of high GDP growth countries. We undertake a 
GMM estimator-based analysis of dynamic panel data using GDP growth rates and  specific 
bank stock returns to isolate the growth effects of banks in ten emerging market economies, 
considered homogenous from a descriptive analysis of World Bank Governance indicators and 
geographically similar. We also find significant state monitoring in the banking sector in these 
ten regimes and factor in regulatory effectiveness as well as state ownership of banks.  A 
contemporaneous data generating process underlies opportunity generation, identification, 
analysis and information enrichment as well as decision making and financing of growth. This 
data generating process along with common information processes feeds market information 
and macroeconomic aggregates. Banks possess superior private information on the economic 
opportunity universe and an analysis of specific bank stock portfolio returns shows that banks’ 
contribution to the processes that lead to generation of growth. However, this also explains an 
almost total lack of contemporaneous correlation as tested by us in a Structural VAR analysis 
available on request from the authors. (Pairwise correlations are reported in Table 2)  
Our paper also contributes to the current findings in the literature about the lack of information 
in market indices in relation to GDP growth. Our sample includes Asian economies in India, 
China, Singapore, Hongkong, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. 
While we expect bank stocks in general to explain more about future growth expectations, we 
cannot neglect the effects of the global financial crisis in changing these expectations about 
growth materially. It can be seen that banks reacted differently and more intensely to the crisis, 
but stocks healed well to regulatory pronouncements and may have led the economy back with 
a bigger coefficient for their effect on economic growth during the crisis years compared with 
a negative effect of banks in the developed markets in the crisis period. We find that Asian 
stock market indices are not in tune with GDP growth measures allowing bank stocks to carry 
most of the GDP growth specific information in these countries.  However, other studies with 
recent data have confirmed that the stock market index is no longer a significant informant or 
determinant of GDP growth memes.  As found earlier in an 18-country emerging market sample 
by Cole, Moshirian and Wu(2008) a market capitalization weighted index of bank stocks in 
these countries contributes much higher though there is a limited bi-directional causality 
between bank stocks and GDP growth. We expect this to be the import of a contemporaneous 
data generating process which is enhanced by banks’ using their private information. Given the 
systemically critical role of banks we find that while Stock Market indices do not specify GDP 
growth, there is a direct effect of bank portfolio returns on the high mean GDP growth.  
We present literature that helps strengthen our understanding and revisit some other papers that 
have a different view of the interaction between bank and stock market in their contribution to 
economic development (Deidda and Fattouh, 2008).   
We extend the analysis to ten countries in Asia that have retained the growth memes. Average 
GDP growth in the sample is over 5% (Table 1). 3-month Treasury Bill rates in each domestic 
regime are utilized to compute excess returns from quarterly returns to regress against quarterly 
GDP growth and its immediate lag. While economic aggregates and banking sector specific 
aggregates including Private sector credit are usually studied for bi-directional causality with 
GDP growth, we isolate the effective nature of government ownership of banks found in 7 of 
the 10 regimes studied. Also, we found that the ongoing global crisis only dented GDP growth 
by 30-40 basis points while bank stocks specify a higher than 2% contribution to GDP growth 
for 1% excess returns. We expect to also isolate the effects of bank mergers and bank stock 
volatility in a separate research to supplement these results.   
Our research uncovers the critical interplay between Government ownership and effectiveness 
of government based on the dimension indices in the World Bank WGI Indicators. Instead of 
Insider trading Law and Accounting disclosure standards we employ a rule of law indicator 
also from another dimensional index of the World Bank WGI indicators.  
The insignificance of market indices might denote the stable expectations of GDP growth 
marginalizing market indices’ overall role in tracking GDP growth, while excess returns in the 
Bank sample retain significant information contribution to GDP growth over and above 
measures of Private sector credit, liquidity and the size of banking assets in relation to the 
central bank balance sheet.   
This research explores relevant literature in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 discuss the data and the 
methodology in detail only in the main document. We end with our main results and discuss 
the future implications of this research.     
  
2.  Literature Review   
There is a rich recent literature around bank equities and Financial development as well as 
delineation of the recent Global Financial crisis. Gibson, Hall and Tavlas (2017) review the 
modeling of bank equity prices during the crisis deploying a three-equation model in Panel 
GMM (log-level of Prices) to recover a recursive impact of the crisis between sovereigns and 
banks. Our study of the crisis in Asia shows that such a recursive relationship was instrumental 
in extending the crisis in Asian markets. Allegret, Raymond and Rharrabti (2017) do a similar 
analysis and justify the period of extended crisis in Europe using an endogenous definition of 
crisis periods. They also point to delayed connections across sovereign swaps and bank equity 
markets.   
Other considered estimators that connects Financial sector variables and GDP growth include 
mixed frequency sampling or MIDAS regressions. These are likely to measure banking sector 
growth as part of economic aggregates as in the macroeconomic literature.   Fufa and Kim 
(2017) look at some homogenous panels, continuing in the tradition of using Panel GMM to 
measure financial sector aggregates against economic development in high income and low-
income countries.    
Our research relates more to the literature corresponding to causation in individual bank level 
governance as well as regulation and growth. Diallo (2017) recover the important effect of 
better Corporate Governance levels at a country level on 34 external finance dependent 
manufacturing sectors, moderating the effect of bank concentration and economic growth. 
Mishkin (2009) points to the advantages of financial globalization and the critical role of 
property rights and a well-directed financial system to achieving high economic growth in 
emerging markets. Williams (2014) analyses the influence of national governance on bank  
level risk in Asia.    
Beck and Levine (2004) established a dynamic panel and produced the first recent robust 
evidence that stock markets and banks influence economic growth controlling for omitted 
variables and unobserved country specific effects. They take into consideration various theories 
expecting financial development to harm growth and stability and explaining the role of banks 
in easing information frictions. Prior studies before them model aggregate variables like 
M3/GDP to model financial sector’s impact on GDP growth but do not consider any enhancing 
role of the stock markets. Mishra and Narayan (2015) use a non-parametric model to match np 
financial system variables in measuring Economic growth and use Private Credit and Domestic 
credit to represent the Financial system and alternate with Market Capitalization(significant) 
and Volume of Stocks traded (insignificant). Ductor and Grechyna (2015) establish the 
relationship between Financial Development and Growth as non-linear heightening the chances 
of a negative relationship when Credit does not translate into growth in real output. Goes(2016) 
shows that institutional quality improvement by 1% leads to a 1.7% increase in GDP per capita. 
Thus, we analyze the impact of our domestic institutions on bank growth directly through their 
stock returns on growth memes. We find that the selected characteristics describe salience of 
the selected sample of countries along governance parameters and perceptible superior returns 
in weighted bank stock portfolios reflecting the advantage of private information of the growth 
generating processes.    
However, Ma and Wohar(2014) caution against the indiscriminate specification of VAR 
models and use of expected returns in valuation models and also show the value impact of 
operating cash flow measures. We may incorporate later research using cash flows as well.  
Du et al (2016) use a recent sample spanning the GFC in 37 countries to measure the 
information content in bank stock prices, resolving how banks with higher information 
disclosures reduce extreme negative returns, extending our results to the positive nature of 
transparent disclosure requirements in bank supervision regimes.  Umar and Sun(2017) study 
the different impact of leverage on stock liquidity for large (positive) and small (negative) 
banks in a BRICS sample. We however do not consider stock liquidity in our research. 
Similarly, Banerjee et al (2017) show the risk impact of off-balance sheet derivatives, primarily 
rate swaps while reflecting the impact of size, interest spreads and capital ratios.  Shezaad and 
Haan (2013) show the quick bounce back of bank stocks in Emerging markets due to the crisis 
and continuing lower prices of banks in the developed world. Managerial efficiency and loan 
quality continue to be effective measures of value in the GFC and large bank stocks were more 
underpriced in the developed world during the crisis. Badaruddin et al (2011) use bank stock 
returns to support the endogeneity theory of money supply and the effect of money supply on 
stock prices.   
Effects of international central bank cooperation and other expected spillovers from 
international markets, may be significantly transmitted by banks’ stock prices to growth or vice 
versa. (Andries et al, 2017). The crisis also affected public discussions on bank stock ratings 
(Salvador, 2017) and meaningfully impacted bank stock returns as well as GDP growth. We 
do analysis to heighten any structure and magnitude differences during the crisis in the chosen 
Financial markets. Allegret et al (2017) do a similar analysis limited to the sovereign debt crisis 
period in Europe using a four-factor model enhanced with sovereign risk.   
Bank governance issues reflect an important endpoint for readers of this research in affecting 
investor attractiveness. Pathan and Faff(2013) show the effect of important governance 
variables in recent data. Masulis and Zhang(2017), Banerjee, Masulis and Upadhyay(2018) and 
Liu et al (2017) represent a leading body of corporate governance literature closely examining 
issues of corporate governance and institutions.  
3.   Hypothesis 
A quickly deployed VAR system (available with the authors) specifying the inter relationships 
between bank stock portfolios, stock index and GDP growth shows no relationship between the 
three variables because of contemporaneous interplay of all three through investors, experts 
and industry on one hand and traders, investors and bankers on the other hand, as well as firm, 
sector and industry specific unobserved heterogeneity at play. Our intuition suggests banks 
possess superior private information about macroeconomic and microeconomic factors as well 
as the specific skills with entrepreneurs that can be gainfully employed in a given economic 
opportunity universe. Banks can harness this private information and will likely be rewarded 
for the same notwithstanding selfish motives of managers and other losses on the way to 
information production and consequent GDP growth based on real production and value added 
in the economy. 
Hypothesis 1: Banks will produce superior market returns because of their private information 
and these superior returns will lead consequent economic growth 
As GDP growth is higher in emerging markets, the likely relation of GDP growth to bank stock 
portfolios will be higher and consequent in choosing bank portfolios for superior returns in 
these markets.  
Hypothesis 2: Markets proxied by stock indices will be unable to produce superior market 
returns because of their inability to reach bank specific private information. 
This may prima facie be because industrials without unlisted Private equity / Venture Capital 
investments and apart from expert private information in banks, no longer possess any 
contemporaneous information advantages that lead GDP growth and rely on announcements 
and public information and may thus lag GDP growth. Pan and Mishra(2018) and Banerjee, 
Ahmed and Hossain (2017) find that stock markets as providers of capital  
4.  Experiment Design: Data and Methodology    
We employ Arellano Bond (1991) GMM estimators using Dynamic panel data as in Cole 
(2008) but discover that only the System GMM estimator performs to expectations. The 
Difference GMM estimator fails because of the magnitude differences between the level and 
difference-based instrumentation requiring us to depend on the System GMM estimator. We 
also find that robustness tests employing the exogenous Instrumentation variables in a 2SLS 
GMM and the panel OLS estimation confirm our results using the System GMM estimator. 
Gippel, Smith and Zhu (2015) review GMM estimators in resolving endogeneity. We create 
the dataset relying on Difference GMM and system GMM estimators for Dynamic panel data. 
We select quarterly bank stock returns as well as market capitalization of each included bank 
and retrieve the quarterly data for GDP growth for the selected 10 countries from Reuters 
Datastream. The portfolio of banks included in each of the 10 markets include at least the banks 
included in the broad-based market index in each domestic stock market and those engaged in 
transactions in the markets for corporate control. The resulting bank stock portfolio is thus 
weighted by the Market Capitalization and is not an equal weighted index. The market factor 
is retrieved from the broad-based market index’s quarterly returns. We consider both IFS data 
from the IMF and the World Bank data for interest rates and GDP growth. We construct excess 
returns directly from the one-month risk free rate as in Cole et al (2008).   
We then construct a structural model in the specification   
g(t) = a + .g(t-1) + .rm(t)+2.rb(t) + 3.X(t) + i + it where rb(t) = ri(t)/n  
for each of the n banks included in the domestic market analyzed.  To motivate the GMM Panel 
analysis we employ country specific impulse response functions (IRF) and a SVAR framework 
to discover the limitations of VAR frameworks in eliciting contemporaneous constructs. The 
same is available with the authors on request. We determine the importance of the underlying 
data generating process in missing correlations between bank stock portfolios and GDP growth 
and use GMM estimators in Dynamic Panel Estimation to isolate the coefficient of weighted 
bank stock portfolios on economic growth to establish a baseline for these countries and 
compare with the global environment, given the structural isolation of the developed world in 
USA and Europe as well as the various longer lasting influences of the crisis on emerging 
markets. The limited nature of correlations between the bank portfolio returns and GDP growth 
processes strengthens our belief in a common data generating process reliant on the banks’ own 
private information. We attempt both one step and two step Dynamic panel data estimations 
using xtabond2 in stata and confirm with Baum’s ivreg2 command (Baum, 2014) using highly 
correlated memes like Private Credit and Money supply as well as Government effectiveness 
and rule of law in the first stage instrumentation. Alternate instrumental variables and panel 
regression designs were employed using robust and newey west errors for comparison. The 
results of two step Dynamic panel data estimations are robust with the instrumental 2SLS 
design. The 2SLS design and other robustness tests compensate for the overidentification 
problem in the original formulation with 10 country panels and 71 time series observations. 
The GMM Difference specification of the Arellano Bond estimators used in Cole et al (2008) 
suffers from the problem of larger instruments using only the differences as instruments. The 
GMM System estimator can recover robust estimates using both the level and differences as 
instruments (Bond et al., 2001). The resulting overidentification as indicated in the Sargan test 
is mitigated by using instrumental variable regression for the same specifications. Additional 
variables and removal of various macroeconomic aggregates loads the Government’s role in 
GDP growth in the bank ownership parameter, thus underlining the importance of robust legal 
regulatory and Institutional frameworks in the homogenous sample selected by ourselves. This 
is especially true when panel regressions are attempted without the lag GDP growth variable. 
However, VAR analysis shows the structural measurement of GDP growth to be a near 
certainty and the same is retained. Bond and Söderbom (2009) elicits more information in 
structurally modelled parameters and GMM estimation. Stationarity restrictions are maintained 
in the model. Endogeneity between the variables is considered carefully in the use of Arellano 
and Bond estimators as the specification implies macroeconomic data generation processes 
raising issues of simultaneity, heterogeneity and omitted variables. As an example, our 
selection of governance indicators seems to be ceding a large magnitude of the effect to 
Government ownership of banks as the residual cause of regulatory governance in the GDP 
growth generation process.  World Bank Data provides a comprehensive six-dimensional index 
of World Governance indicators which are highly correlated but each sub index measures a 
different dimension of Governance standards at the country level. The use of WGI indicators 
are therefore beneficial to the formulation and we replace rule of law dimension scores and 
Government effectiveness dimension scores from the WGI data in the original Cole et al (2008) 
formulation for insider trading law and accounting changes.  
We consider a single panel of all the ten markets. The average growth rate for GDP is positive 
and expected market risk factors are in line for growth markets. The average bank excess return 
mapped to the Cole et al (2008) methodology is largely positive. The correlation between GDP 
and bank stock returns is less than 0.15. We experiment with other control variables to regress 
with weighted bank stock portfolio returns and include it in the vector of Xi (where only lagged 
returns are considered in the base specification as instruments).    
Bank stocks may not reflect their true valuations because of the larger private information 
associated with sophisticated bank managers. Blau et al (2017) show this opacity adversely 
affects banks’ stock prices in delays and market inefficiency, yet we expect our analysis of 
stock prices to be more informative of banks’ effects on GDP growth than macroeconomic 
measures of credit and/or deposits.   
In the robustness tests we use the endogeneity theory of money supply and the seeming relation 
between Rule of Law and Government effectiveness (observed correlations of 70%) Trade and 
FDI impact on the variables were not required in the control set but may be grounds for future 
research especially for active investment professionals along with causation from higher 
moments including skew and kurtosis.   
  
4.  Results and Discussion  
The entire data series extends from 1999q1-2017q3 resulting in 71 observations for each 
country in the sample. 10 portfolios are constructed from individual banks using data from 
Reuters Datastream(Eikon). The series of banks is selected from  Datastream , already adjusted 
for survivor bias till 1995. The corresponding macroeconomic aggregates are retrieved on a 
quarterly basis as Financial development measures including ratios of Private credit(Priv) to 
GDP and Commercial-Central Bank(CCB) asset ratios. The Money supply aggregate ratios 
(M2Liq) are directly retrieved from the World Bank data series.  As emerging market data is 
available in depth as of 2018, this seems to be a doable task for any homogenous group of 
countries or in determining such a group of homogenous countries. We apply World Bank 
Governance indicators to verify the homogeneity of the group of countries as macroeconomic 
aggregate data from the group has different outliers in each series. Two out of the six WGI 
indicators, namely Rule of Law (Law) and Government effectiveness(Geff) are used in line with 
the research design and we drop Insider trading law and Bank accounting disclosure variables 
for the same. The Dummy crisis indicator (Dcris) is deployed as 1 for the period in 2009q1-
2012q2 in line with our analysis reflecting a late incidence of crisis in the emerging markets 
(The MSCI EM Index returns for 2008 are upwards of 35%) and the extensive overlap with the 
European sovereign debt crisis in 2011.  The World Bank survey data on banks has three data 
points on bank ownership by the state, (Govt).   
As in Cole(2008) our experiment shows that one standard deviation change in bank stock 
returns would increase economic growth by 10-15 basis points on average , and much higher 
for higher growth dispensations. The market factor may have a higher effect, but this also 
includes the growth effects engendered by the bank relationships and the bank equity returns’ 
contribution is over and above the contribution from the market factor. However even the bank 
equity factor excludes cash flows to unlisted sectors /privately held firms that is increasing with 
the rise of venture capital and private equity funded service economy firms. Banks are 
significant harbingers of growth in emerging markets driven by growth. We find substantial 
contribution of public sector banks in the specification for India led by the State Bank of India. 
Serial acquirers such as ICICI Bank and Kotak are also significant contributors. Similarly, 
active acquirers are found to be significant in the sample in China, India and Singapore among 
others.    
[Insert Table 1 here]  
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample.  GDP growth in the chosen sample is 
a high 5.1% on average and government ownership of banks is a high 28%. The sample 
countries are homogenous on World Governance Indicators with Singapore and Hongkong city 
states , nearly 100% in both Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness. The mean for the 
sample is 71.7% rank in Rule of Law and 63.2% in Government effectiveness. In the chosen 
sample countries, we have chosen a contiguous period of the Global Financial Crisis and the 
European Sovereign Debt crisis in consultation with the various literature foregoing extensive 
Crises database references considering the extensive impact of the twin crises on the global 
economy. The crisis impacted the region late, incident from 2009 Q1 and lasted till mid 2012 
(2012 Q2) lasting 14 quarters. The Market index returns may have been attenuated because of 
the higher short-term rates prevalent in the region, with a mean of just 0.56%. 213 banks 
contributed to bank portfolios from Datastream and quarterly Rb averages 2%.   
(The Kuala Lumpur index data is only available from 2009 and similar restrictions reduce the 
data at the country level from the 71 quarters) 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  
 We deploy the GMM System estimator recommended in Cole , Moshirian and Wu (2008). The 
pairwise correlations (Table 2) also provide hints to motivate a well- formed response in Panel 
GMM estimation when Rm and Rb are considered endogenous in the specification.   
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Panel GMM results are shown in Table 3 for the complete specification in Model 6. Wald test 
holds for more sparse specifications wherein we found effective results for the unbalanced 
panel with just Rm and Rb , and consequently with the addition of each exogenous variable 
with quarterly of annual series data. The Sargan test shows overidentification as expected and 
we step on to the 2SLS to show the same results in an exactly identified specification. A high 
degree of heterogeneity is confirmed in the data, eliciting the most important cause for 
heterogeneity. The Hausman test confirms use of fixed effects in light of the heterogeneity. 
Government effectiveness may be highly correlated to Rule of Law and are also used in the,  
but the result is likely robust given the adopted methodology.   
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
  
Bank stocks seem to contain contemporaneous information regarding macroeconomic success 
beyond banking aggregates in high growth emerging markets. This superior information in 
bank stock performance outperforms the market index which does not contain any valuable 
information regarding the expectedly high economic growth.  A one SD shock to Bank stock 
returns can create a positive GDP growth shock of a further 22 basis points in the countries in 
the sample. The results also suggest increases in the Rule of Law variable and continued 
government ownership of banks create positive growth momentum in the region rewarding 
good governance. SVAR results available with the authors do show a significant variance 
component of Bank stock returns to GDP growth in Singapore, Malaysia and Hongkong where 
banks are privately owned. However, the economies of the area have largely benefitted from 
the closer monitoring of the banking sector and the capitalization/ ownership of banks by 
governments and in regressions without the lagged variables or Macroeconomic aggregates,  
Govt (Government ownership by banks) loads the coefficients showing its importance in the 
formulation and consequently lack of availability in the instrumentation. Table 4 presents the 
System GMM specification without the constant, confirming the same results. We find the 
crisis effect damped when t_qtr* is directly used in the specification but primary variables 
retain their significance and direction of effect.  
4.2 Robustness  
Table 5 presents alternate robustness tests using instrumentation in endogenous supply of 
money (Priv and M2Liq) and the correlations between sub-indices of WGI in Law and Geff. 
The appendix includes other specifications using ordinary regression (cluster) panel 
instrumental regression, and other instrumental variable regressions. They all reflect the 
superiority of the GMM Panel specification in mitigating endogeneity, thereby emphasizing 
the impact of the Crisis even in emerging country panels and sometimes eliciting false effects 
especially of Commercial credit and overall market indices (reduced by the uniform higher 
risk-free rates in the region)  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
  
4.3 Other significant results  
Al-Moulani and Alexiou(2017) use GMM estimators for Dynamic panel data models used here 
to investigate the overall relationship between banking sector depth and economic growth in 
194 countries confirming some of our findings and providing insight into the negative relation 
between Private Credit measures and GDP growth. The negative effect of Private credit is 
uniform in the sample based on the observed inflection point of 80-100% ratio of Private sector 
credit to GDP.   
Soedarmano, Sitorus and Tarazi (2017) point out significant deterioration in bank systemic risk 
from abnormal loan growth using credit standards during a crisis. This partly explains the 
important effects of Governance and resulting premium on sustained GDP growth that can be 
further improved with increase in governance standards.   
We also expect stock market returns to be consistently motivated by the same data generating 
process as the GDP growth and based in generated private information on the state of the 
economy and opportunities and avenues for investment and growth including external finance 
dependent firms that do well in crises, the bank stocks easily outperform the market index and 
provide such additional information through prices of bank equities. Though restricted to single 
non-representative stock markets Pan and Mishra(2018) and Banerjee, Ahmed and Hossain 
(2017) also confirm that stock market indices do not contain similar information thus negating 
earlier results till the early 2000s.   
  
5.  Future Implications  
Bank stocks are significant determinants of GDP growth in strong emerging market economies 
and stronger institutional characteristics shown by acquisition active firms and stronger 
corporate governance banks can lead to deepening and consistency of growth memes for the 
broader industry and the larger public economy in these markets. Even during the crises GDP 
growth and bank stock returns remain highly positive for these economies. None of the selected 
economies is significantly affected by dollarization. Risk and Investment managers can 
significantly extract value from the away shares of their portfolios and gainfully achieve the 
objectives of meaningfully increasing the away share of larger closed and open-ended funds by 
choosing emerging markets with better and consistent governance memes. An investment in 
national bank portfolios can gainfully mark entry into unknown investment destinations if 
supported by minimum institutional frameworks.  The analysis establishes that portfolio 
managers can extract benefits intelligently by grouping similar country sets on better 
governance and parameters available in contemporary data for a large set of emerging markets. 
This may follow both geographically contiguous outlines or noncontiguous country sets 
defined by similar institutional frameworks.  
Stock returns of banks can meaningfully predict vital economic growth and markets for 
corporate control significantly impact this growth accretion positively.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Performance and control variables.  
 
The entire data series extends from 1999q1-2017q3 resulting in 71 observations for each country in the sample. 10 portfolios are constructed from 
individual banks using data from Reuters Datastream for India, China, Hongkong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Control measures (Financial Development) are used as ratios of GDP (Priv, M2Liq) and Central Bank assets (CCB). World Bank 
Governance Indicators (Law, Geff) and Govt ownership of banks (Govt) while Crisis Dummy is binary 0 or 1. The Quarterly returns of the Market 
index in each case is netted by the three-month Risk-free rate. All data is referenced from Reuters Eikon/Datastream including the IMF Economic 
Series. Annual data from World Bank Statistics is used where aggregate data is required only as an exogenous regressor as the series does not 
have any missing data. World Governance Indictors series provide data for Rule of Law (Law) and Government effectiveness (Geff) from among 
the six dimensions available for these indicators. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
VARIABLES  N  Mean  Sd  Min  max  Var  skewness  kurtosis  p25  p75  
  
Growth (Dyg)  
  
624  
  
0.0510  
  
0.0352  
  
-0.0946  
  
0.249  
  
0.00124  
  
0.0269  
  
6.490  
  
0.0315  
  
0.0687  
Market index 
Returns (Rm)  
624  0.00568  0.118  -0.466  0.419  0.0140  -0.281  4.321  -0.0474  0.0741  
Bank Portfolio 
Returns (Rb)  
624  0.0211  0.141  -0.470  0.637  0.0200  0.320  5.631  -0.0503  0.0924  
Crisis Dummy 
(Dcris)  
624  0.212  0.409  0  1  0.167  1.413  2.996  0  0  
Govt 
ownership 
of  banks 
(Govt)  
624  0.284  0.294  0  1  0.0862  1.079  3.131  0  0.385  
Private Credit 
(Priv)  
624  1.499  1.654  0.182  6.338  2.735  2.051  5.907  0.446  1.417  
   
 
 
  
   
Money Supply 
(M2Liq)  
624  2.286  2.686  0.196  10.29  7.213  1.758  4.821  0.655  2.517  
Commercial-
Central  
Bank (CCB)  
624  3.165  4.937  0.146  28.05  24.38  2.958  11.97  1.001  2.670  
Rule of Law 
(Law)  
624  0.717  0.186  0.382  1  0.0345  0.0687  1.640  0.555  0.877  
Governance 
Effectiveness  
(Geff)  
  
624  
  
0.632  
  
0.227  
  
0.198  
  
0.962  
  
0.0517  
  
-0.0848  
  
1.533  
  
0.407  
  
0.841  
  
TABLE 2 
 
Table 2: Correlation between the three primary variables, GDP growth, Returns to market Index (Rm) and Returns to Bank portfolios (Rb) and 
the exogenous regressors in the control variables 
                 Dyg         Rm           Rb            Govt            Dcris           Geff             Law           CCB          Priv          M2Liq     
Dyg                1                                                                                                                          
Rm            0.0478            1                                                                                                             
Rb               0.0939*       0.713***         1                                                                                                
Govt            0.373***     0.0225       0.0936*           1                                                                                   
Dcris          -0.0146         0.132***    0.0976*      0.0303            1                                                                      
Geff            -0.243***    -0.0286      -0.0786*      -0.541***   -0.0278            1                                                         
Law            -0.232***    -0.0336      -0.0962*      -0.599***  -0.00384        0.949***         1          
CCB            -0.158***   -0.0505      -0.0653       -0.403***   -0.0546        0.460***     0.474***         1                               
Priv            -0.204***    -0.0291      -0.0610       -0.155***   -0.0127        0.451***     0.430***    0.0671            1                  
M2Liq         -0.189***  -0.0251      -0.0601       -0.204***  -0.00109        0.437***     0.425***     0.141***     0.941***         1     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
  
TABLE 3 
 
Table 3:Dynamic panel data using System GMM estimators.  
The final specification confirming the use of all control variables is in Model 6. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
  
Market Index returns   
  
-0.00966  
  
0.00231  
  
0.00166  
  
0.00121  
  
0.000961  
  
0.000311  
(Rm)  (0.00800)  (0.00794)  (0.00792)  (0.00794)  (0.00797)  (0.00794)  
Bank Portfolio   0.0277***  0.0109  0.0115*  0.0129*  0.0141**  0.0134**  
returns (Rb)  (0.00671)  (0.00667)  (0.00665)  (0.00667)  (0.00670)  (0.00667)  
Dummy variable for     -0.00278*  -0.00301*  -0.00308*  -0.00357**  -0.00395**  
crisis (Dcris)    (0.00161)  (0.00161)  (0.00161)  (0.00162)  (0.00162)  
Govt ownership of     0.0416***  0.0431***  0.0462***  0.0481***  0.0475***  
banks (Govt)    (0.00226)  (0.00229)  (0.00284)  (0.00283)  (0.00290)  
Private Credit to GDP     -0.00314***  -0.00741***  -0.00386***  -0.00345***  -
0.00842***  
(Priv)    (0.000400)  (0.00118)  (0.000447)  (0.000448)  (0.00125)  
Commercial-Central         -0.000253    -
0.000423***  
Bank (CCB)        (0.000154)    (0.000162)  
Rule of law(Law)        0.0186***  0.0672***  0.0634***  
        (0.00518)  (0.0118)  (0.0121)  
Money supply to GDP      0.00282***      0.00321***  
(M2Liq)      (0.000731)      (0.000752)  
Government           -0.0443***  -0.0393***  
effectiveness (Geff)          (0.00928)  (0.00945)  
Constant  0.0505***  0.0443***  0.0438***  0.0315***  0.0229***  0.0241***  
  (0.000671)  (0.00119)  (0.00120)  (0.00390)  (0.00436)  (0.00448)  
  
Observations  
  
624  
  
624  
  
624  
  
624  
  
624  
  
624  
Number of ctry  10  10  10  10  10  10  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The lag GDP term is included in all specifications but suppressed (the coefficient is always more than 70-75%) 
  
TABLE 4 
 
Table 4: Dynamic panel data using System GMM estimators.  
The specifications below refit the system without the constant growth which is shown to be improbable in Table 3. The final specification confirming 
the use of all control variables is in Model 7.  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
    
Market Index returns   
  
-0.00966  
  
-0.0561***  
  
-0.00920  
 
-0.0102  
  
-0.000620  
 
-0.000227  -0.00136  
(Rm)  (0.00800)  (0.00965)  (0.00816)  (0.00812)  (0.00796)  (0.00800)  (0.00797)  
Bank Portfolio   0.0277***  0.110***  0.0250***  0.0258***  0.0153**  0.0163**  0.0169**  
returns (Rb)  (0.00671)  (0.00801)  (0.00685)  (0.00682)  (0.00668)  (0.00671)  (0.00668)  
Dummy variable for       0.0133***  0.0126***  -0.00241  -0.00344**  -0.00392**  
crisis (Dcris)      (0.00160)  (0.00159)  (0.00162)  (0.00163)  (0.00163)  
Govt ownership of       0.0917***  0.0937***  0.0618***  0.0580***  0.0581***  
banks (Govt)      (0.00187)  (0.00188)  (0.00210)  (0.00211)  (0.00221)  
Private Credit to GDP      0.00562***  -0.00259**  -0.00478***  -0.00379***  -
0.00915***  
(Priv)      (0.000332)  (0.00120)  (0.000433)  (0.000445)  (0.00125)  
Commercial-Central         0.00531***      0.00339***  
Bank (CCB)        (0.000747)      (0.000753)  
Rule of law(Law)          -0.000435***    -
0.000420*** 
          (0.000153)    (0.000159)  
Money supply to 
GDP  
        0.0577***  0.115***  0.112***  
(M2Liq)          (0.00187)  (0.00763)  (0.00764)  
Government             -0.0668***  -0.0610***  
effectiveness (Geff)            (0.00827)  (0.00837)  
Constant  
  
    
0.0505***  
(0.000671)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
Observations  624  624  624  624  624  624  624  
No.of ctry  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The lag GDP term is included in all specifications but suppressed (the coefficient is always more than 70-75%) 
 
 
  
TABLE 5 
 
Table 5: Dynamic panel data using System GMM estimators.  
The specifications below refit the system without the constant growth which is shown to be improbable in Table 3. Models 6 and 7 represent the 
2sls using endogeneity on supply of money and Private credit. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
VARIABLES  Model 1  
OLS Cluster  
Id   
Model 2  
Newey  
Geff=Law  
Model 6  
IV 2SLS  
Geff = Law  
Model 8  
IV 2SLS  
Geff= Law 
robust  
Model 9  
IV 2SLS  
M2Liq = Priv  
+ CCB, 
robust  
Model 6  
IV 2SLS  
GMM    
M2Liq=Priv  
Model 7  
IV 2SLS  
GMM   
Priv=M2Liq  
Model 8  
IV 2SLS  
GMM  
Law=Geff  
Model 9  
IV 2SLS  
GMM  
Geff=Law  
  
Rm  
  
0.0129*  
  
-0.00286  
  
0.0132**  
  
0.0132**  
  
0.0135**  
  
0.0137  
  
0.0137  
  
0.0130  
  
0.0132  
  (0.00649)  (0.0202)  (0.00659)  (0.00659)  (0.00596)  (0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.0103)  (0.0107)  
Rb  0.0202***  0.0164  0.0200***  0.0200***  0.0199***  0.0194**  0.0195**  0.0203**  0.0200**  
  (0.00571)  (0.0169)  (0.00574)  (0.00574)  (0.00512)  (0.00877)  (0.00875)  (0.00864)  (0.00878)  
Dcris  0.00140  -0.00177  0.00187**  0.00187**  0.00155  0.00155  0.00153  0.00168  0.00187  
  (0.00116)  (0.00498)  (0.000868)  (0.000868)  (0.00110)  (0.00239)  (0.00239)  (0.00209)  (0.00242)  
Geff  -0.00459  0.0659***  0.0150***  0.0150***  -0.00479  -0.000463  -0.000901    0.0150***  
  (0.0101)  (0.00606)  (0.00409)  (0.00409)  (0.00981)  (0.0152)  (0.0151)    (0.00453)  
Law  0.0146        0.0102  0.00281  0.00233  0.0130***    
  (0.00913)        (0.0103)  (0.0192)  (0.0192)  (0.00301)    
Govt  0.0121***  0.0677***  0.0143***  0.0143***  0.0108***  0.00884**  0.00889**  0.0136***  0.0143***  
  (0.00336)  (0.00595)  (0.00178)  (0.00178)  (0.00303)  (0.00382)  (0.00385)  (0.00321)  (0.00474)  
L.Dyg  0.754***    0.763***  0.763***  0.759***  0.755***  0.756***  0.759***  0.763***  
  (0.0436)    (0.0411)  (0.0411)  (0.0409)  (0.0582)  (0.0581)  (0.0264)  (0.0551)  
M2Liq  0.00124*  0.00453***    -0.000566***  -0.000612***  -0.000551    0.00138  0.00151***  
  (0.000552)  (0.000993)    (0.000205)  (0.000213)  (0.000465)    (0.000982)  (0.000560)  
Priv  -0.00289**  -0.0126***  -0.00360***  -0.00360***      -0.000571  -0.00315*  -0.00360***  
  (0.000897)  (0.00209)  (0.000786)  (0.000786)      (0.000714)  (0.00163)  (0.00125)  
CCB  -0.000242**  -0.000789*  -0.000326***  -0.000326***    -0.000144  -0.000154  -0.000262  -0.000326*  
  (9.67e-05)  (0.000476)  (0.000123)  (0.000123)    (0.000184)  (0.000187)  (0.000209)  (0.000187)  
t_qtr  1.27e-05        2.52e-05          
  (1.94e-05)        (1.72e-05)          
Constant           0.00883*  0.00902*    
           (0.00494)  (0.00501)    
Observations  614  624  614  614  614  614  614  614  614  
R-squared  0.885          0.645  0.646  0.885  0.884  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The lag GDP term is included in all specifications but suppressed (the coefficient is always more than 70-75%) 
 
 
 
  
 
